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MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et a l M : 
Defendants- : 
Respondents. ; 
: Case No. 20040 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by investors in Grove 
Finance Company against the State of Utah and the Department of 
Financial Institutions to recover the amount of the investment 
lost when Grove Finance became insolvent in 1980. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District 
Court, granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
basis of governmental immunity. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the order granting 
summary judgment and a remand to the district court allowing 
the case to proceed to trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Grove Finance Company was incorporated in 1960 as a 
small loan business pursuant to Section 7-10-1, ej; seq*, Utah 
Code Ann, (repealed 1969). (R. at 837, 771.) From 1960 until 
1969 Grove Finance Company operated as a small loan business. 
When the Small Loan Act was repealed in 1969, Grove 
Finance Company opted to become a supervised lender pursuant to 
Section 70B-3-501, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (R. at 838, 772.) 
In 1969, W. Smoot Brimhall, who was at that time the 
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions, made 
a determination that Grove Finance Company as a supervised 
lender was not subject to the Department's jurisdiction under 
Sections 7-1-7 and 7-1-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953). (R. at 
379-380, 839, 772.) The Department of Financial Institutions, 
pursuant to Section 70B-3-506, Utah Code Ann., established a 
procedure whereby it made annual examinations of the loan 
records of Grove Finance Company. (R. at 839, 773.) 
From the early 1970,s until its closure in 1980, Grove 
Finance Company held itself out to the general public as 
accepting monies on deposit and in fact did accept monies on 
deposit. (R. at 839, 864-865, Deposition of Howard Sherwood, 
pg 14.) 
From the early 1970,s until its closure in 1980, Grove 
Finance Company through its agents and in the mass media 
advertised that deposits made in Grove Finance Company were 
insured up to $10,000. (R. at 839, 835, Deposition of Howard 
Sherwood, pg 23.) 
Between 1969 and 1980, the Department of Financial 
Institutions received a number of telephone calls from 
individuals claiming to be depositors of Grove Finance 
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Company. They stated that they had either a savings 
certificate or a passbook issued by Grove Finance Company. (R. 
at 925.) 
During this same period of time, the Department of 
Financial Institutions received telephone calls from 
individuals inquiring as to whether the debentures sold by 
Grove Finance Company were insured. The Department of 
Financial Institutions was also told that agents of Grove 
Finance Company had represented to the public that the monies 
deposited in the Company were insured up to $10,000. (R. at 
835, Deposition of Howard Sherwood, pg 23.) 
None of the inspections of Grove Finance Company 
performed by the Department of Financial Institutions uncovered 
evidence that Grove Finance Company was accepting monies on 
deposit. (R. at 839, 390.) 
Between 1969 and 1980, Hal S. Haycock, one of the 
officers of Grove Finance Company, commingled the assets of 
Grove Finance Company with his personal assets. (R. at 840.) 
On March 13, 1980, in response to a complaint received 
by the Department of Financial Institutions from the Bank of 
American Fork, the Department of Financial Institutions sent 
Gary R. Cox and Code Shaw to examine Grove Finance Company. 
(R. at 375.) Mr. Cox and Mr. Shaw found that the records of 
Grove Finance Company were in a state of shambles and that the 
information submitted by Grove Finance Company on its reports 
to the Department of Financial Institutions could not be 
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verified or confirmed by the books and records of Grove Finance 
Company. Mr. Cox stated in his report to the Department of 
Financial Institutions: 
The many inconsistencies noted between the 
financial statements received from this company 
which tend to confuse and mislead along with lack 
of bookkeeping and control exhibited by Grove 
Finance Company are a major concern. Bcised on 
the bookkeeping methods being employed by this 
institution, a clear, well-defined accounting 
trail that could be followed does not exist . . . 
(R. at 898.) 
As a direct result of the examination by Messrs. Cox 
and Shaw on April 8, 1980, the Department of Financial 
Institutions issued a cease and desist order to Grove Finance 
Company requiring that it cease and desist from any further 
sales of debentures or any further activity which would result 
in money or other assets being transferred into Grove Finance 
Company in exchange for an obligation of Grove Finance 
Company. (R. at 385, 900A.) 
At approximately the same time that it issued the 
cease and desist order, the State of Utah hired the CPA firm of 
H. Sherwood & Company to audit the books and records of Grove 
Finance Company. (R. at 382, Deposition of Howard Sherwood, pg 
7.) 
On or about July 18, 1980, the Department of Financial 
Institutions petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County to allow the Department of Financial Institutions 
to take possession of Grove Finance Company. On that same day 
an order granting possession of Grove Finance Company was 
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signed by Judge Ballif and the Department of Financial 
Institutions closed Grove Finance Company. (R. at 841.) 
On or about August 22, 1980, Grove Finance Company 
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah. (R. at 841.) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This action originally commenced as three separate 
complaints, each brought by a group of investors in the defunct 
Grove Finance Company. Two of the three actions were 
consolidated on October 27, 1982. (R. at 410-412.) The third 
action was consolidated therein on June 22, 1983. (R. at 
765-766.) 
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss on January 
5, 1983. (R. at 594-595.) The motion was argued before Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson on March 4, 1983 and was denied on May 18, 
1983. (R. at 753-754.) 
The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment 
on July 21, 1983. (R. at 783-784.) The plaintiff brought a 
motion for summary judgment on July 28, 1983. (R. at 
833-834.) These motions were argued before Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson on November 3 and 8, 1983. 
Judge Hanson issued a memorandum decision denying 
plaintiffs' motion and granting defendants1 motion on April 26, 
1984. (R. at 962-966.) An order awarding judgment for the 
defendants was entered on May 22, 1984. (R. at 968-969.) 
A notice of appeal was filed with the district court 
on June 20, 1984. (R. at 761-762.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
HAD A STATUTORY DUTY TO INSPECT GROVE FINANCE COMPANY 
The basic position of the appellants in this action is 
that the Department of Financial Institutions had a statutory 
duty to make certain inspections of Grove Finance Company and 
that the losses sustained by the appellants in this action are 
due to the failure of the State of Utah to make the required 
inspections. 
A* Duty to Inspect Under Title 7. In 1981 the Utah 
State Legislature repealed most of the sections of Title 7 and 
replaced them with the Financial Institutions Act of 1981. The 
cause of action in this case arose prior to this change in 
state law and all citations to sections in Title 7 are to the 
former law as it existed at the time when the cause of action 
arose. 
Grove Finance Company at all times from 1969 to its 
closure in July 1980 was a corporation doing a bcinking business 
under Utah law. Section 7-3-3 which defines a bcinking business 
states as follows: 
Any corporation holding itself out to the public 
as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced 
by a certificate, promissory note or otherwise, 
shall be considered as doing a banking business 
and shall be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter as to such business. 
If this case is allowed to proceed to trial, 
appellants will establish, among other things, that the 
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Department of Financial Institutions was on notice that Grove 
Finance Company was indeed accepting money as if on deposit 
long before the Department issued the April 1980 cease and 
desist order. Knowledge of this activity would have brought 
Grove Finance Company within the purview of Title 7 under 
U.C.A. §7-3-3. 
According to Section 7-1-7 of the Utah Code Ann., all 
financial institutions required to obtain a license under Utah 
law were to be subject to examination by the Bank Commissioner 
and examiners. Section 7-1-7 stated as follows: 
All banks, all loan and trust companies, all 
building and loan associations, all industrial 
loan companies, all credit unions, all small loan 
businesses required to obtain a license under any 
provision of law, and all bank service 
corporations shall be under the supervision of 
the banking department and shall be subject to 
examination by the Bank Commissioner and 
examiners. 
Grove Finance Company was in the business of making 
small loans and, although Chapter 10 of Title 7 dealing with 
small loan companies was repealed in 1969, the language of 
Section 7-1-7, Utah Code Ann., was not changed until 1981. It 
should also be noted that Grove Finance Company even as a 
supervised lender was required to obtain a license from the 
Department of Financial Institutions and was therefore a small 
loan business required to obtain a license under "any provision 
of law." 
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions had a statutory duty to annually visit and examine 
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those financial institutions under his jurisdiction. Section 
7-1-8, Utah Code Ann., provides as follows: 
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall 
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every 
loan and trust corporation, every building and 
loan association, every industrial loan company, 
every small loan business, and every cooperative 
bank, and at least once a year. At every such 
examination careful inquiry shall be made as to 
the condition and resources of each institution 
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its 
affairs, the official actions of its directors 
and officers, the investment and disposition of 
its funds, the security afforded to its members, 
if any, and to those by whom its engagements are 
held, whether or not it is violating any 
provisions of law relating to corporations or to 
the business of the institution examined, whether 
or not it is complying with its articles of 
incorporation and bylaws, and as to such other 
matters as the commissioner may prescribe. 
The Commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions has, therefore, a very clear duty under Title 7 to 
inspect those financial institutions which fall under his 
jurisdiction. 
B. Duty To Inspect Under Title 7QB. While the 
respondents in this case have continually denied that they have 
any duties to inspect Grove Finance Company pursuant to Title 7 
of the Utah Code Ann., the respondents have admitted, however, 
that Grove Finance Company is under their jurisdiction pursuant 
to Title 70B of the Utah code and that the respondents have a 
statutory duty to examine the loans, business and records of 
Grove Finance Company pursuant to Section 70B-3-506 of the Utah 
Code. (R. at 387-388.) 
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Section 70B-3-505 imposes a duty upon every licensee 
to "maintain records in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles and practices and in a manner that will 
enable the administrator to determine whether the licensee is 
complying with the provisions of this act." Grove Finance 
Company was therefore required by Title 70B to keep its records 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles and 
practices. 
Section 70B-3-506, Utah Code Ann., requires: 
That administrator shall examine periodically at 
intervals he deems appropriate the loans, 
business and records of every licensee. 
The Department of Financial Institutions pursuant to 
Section 70B-3-506 established a policy of examining each 
supervised lender subject to its jurisdiction once a year. 
If this case is allowed to proceed to trial, 
appellants will establish, among other things, that the 
inspections of Grove Finance Company conducted by the 
Department of Financial Institutions were inadequate in their 
scope to comply with the requirements of Section 70B-3-506, 
Utah Code Ann. 
In reviewing the motions for summary judgment, the 
district court apparently found that the applicable duties 
under Titles 7 and 70B were discretionary rather than mandatory 
or ministerial under Section 63-30-10(1)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). (R. at 138-139.) Hence, the court found no waiver of 
immunity and judgment was entered for the defendants on the 
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basis of governmental immunity. As will be more fully 
discussed herein, the duties of inspection were in fact 
mandatory or ministerial and the failure of the State in this 
regard cannot be waived. Thus the district court erred in its 
findings on duty to inspect. 
POINT II 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE 
RESPONDENTS FROM SUIT BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED FOR THIS TYPE 
OF NEGLIGENCE ACTION 
The appellants allege and believe they can establish 
at trial that the respondents had statutory duties under both 
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code to supervise the 
financial integrity of Grove Finance Company and that the 
respondents negligently failed to perform said duties. The 
issue before this Court, however, is whether the respondents 
are immune from suit by virtue of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Code states in pertinent 
part: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this Act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function . . . . 
The appellants do not dispute that the regulation of 
financial institutions in the State of Utah is a governmental 
function under the standard set forth in Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), which defines 
a governmental function as an activity of such a unique nature 
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that it can only be performed by a governmental agency. This 
Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)f 
specifically held that the "supervision of financial 
institutions is an activity of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency." 
Therefore, the claim of the appellants is that 
immunity for the negligent conduct alleged in.the case at bar 
has been waived by Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code. This 
section states in pertinent part as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of his employment 
. . . . 
This section of the Governmental Immunity Act clearly 
waives governmental immunity for all governmental entities 
based on a claim of negligence; provided, however, that the 
negligence does not fall into one of the eleven enumerated 
exceptions to this waiver of immunity. 
The district court in its memorandum decision held: 
The nature of defendant Borthick1s actions or 
claimed failure to act even if such were proven, 
are discretionary, and do not fall into a class 
of activities where governmental immunity has 
been waived. 
(R. at 139.) 
This ruling is in error and should be reversed by this 
court. 
A. Respondent's Conduct Did Not Fall Within The 
Definition Of Discretionary Functions. 
Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), states 
that a government entity is immune if the injury: 
(1) Arises out of the discretion or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function/ whether or not the 
discretion is abused • . .. 
In Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the discretionary 
ministerial function distinction is the protection of 
governmental entities from suits for acts and decisions at the 
policymaking level. In this regard, the Court stated: 
This Court has followed the lead of cases 
interpreting the Federal Torts Claim Act by 
distinguishing between those decisions occurring 
at a broad policymaking level and those taking 
place at the implementing operational level. In 
Carroll v. State Road Commussion, this Court 
recognized that almost all acts require some 
degree of discretion, and observed that the 
exception to the waiver set forth in the Act 
should be confined to those decisions and acts 
occurring at the basic policymaking level, and 
not extended to those acts and decisions taking 
place at the operational level, or in other words 
. . . those which concern routine everyday 
matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy 
factors. 
Id. at 519-520. [Emphasis added.] 
The respondents are not immune from suit under the 
discretionary function exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity for negligent injuries because the negligent acts 
occurred when the respondents were operating at the operational 
level. An examination of the relevant statutes in this case 
clearly indicates that the respondents were not operating at 
the broad policymaking level in making the determinations that 
the respondents now claim are immune from suit based on the 
discretionary function exemption. 
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B. The Legislature Not The Respondents Set The 
Policy As To Which Financial Institutions Are 
Subject To The Jurisdiction Of The Department Of 
Financial Institutions. 
The respondents alleged in the lower court that they 
were responsible to make the basic policy determinations as to 
which financial institutions are statutorily subject to the 
Department of Financial Institutions. (R. at 614.) This broad 
policy, however, was not left up to the discretion of the 
respondents in this case, but rather was specifically 
prescribed by the State Legislature. Section 7-3-3 states: 
Any corporation holding itself out to the public 
as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced 
by a certificate, promissory note or otherwise, 
shall be considered as doing a banking business 
and shall be subject to the provisions of this 
Chapter as to such business. [Emphasis added.] 
Clearly in this section of the banking code the State 
Legislature and not the Department of Financial Institutions 
has made the broad policymaking decision as to which 
institutions are subject to banking supervision. was made at 
the Legislative level. The subsequent determinations by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions as to 
which corporations in this state do and do not fit this rather 
clear definition are on he operational level and are not immune 
from suit. 
In Fidelity Casualty Company of New York v. Brightman, 
53 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1931), the court in considering the 
distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions 
stated: 
The Missouri rule is in line with the general run 
of authority that a public official charged with 
discretionary duties is not liable for a mistake 
of judgment or an erroneous performance of said 
duties unless he be guilty of willful wrong in 
relation thereto, but as to ministerial duties he 
is liable for the violation or neglect thereof to 
the party injured thereby and that a mistake of 
judgment does not excuse him. 
Id. at 165. [Emphasis added.] 
There may be some judgment required even in the 
performance of mandatory ministerial duties. However, even if, 
as claimed by the respondents, the Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institutions had to exercise judgment 
in determining which financial institutions came within the 
very specific definition of Section 7-3-3 of the Utah Code, 
such judgment making does not become transformed into a 
discretionary function The Commissioner of the Department of 
Financial Institutions remains liable for a mistake in judgment 
in such a case. 
C. The Legislature Not The Respondents Set The 
Policy As To The Kind Of Supervision To Be 
Exercised By The Department Of Financial 
Institutions. 
The respondents claimed further in the lower court 
that they were required to make a discretionary decision as to 
what kind of supervision the Department of Financial 
Institutions was to exercise over the financial institutions in 
its jurisdiction. (R. at 614.) Again, it is clear from the 
law that this policymaking decision has already been made by 
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the Legislature and was not left up to the Department of 
Financial Institutions. Section 7-1-8 of the Utah Code 
specifically set forth: 
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall 
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every 
loan and trust corporation, every building and 
loan association, every industrial loan company, 
every small loan business, and every cooperative 
bank, at least one a year. At every such 
examination careful inquiry shall be made as to 
the condition and resources of the institution 
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its 
affairs, the official actions of its directors 
and officers, and investment and disposition of 
its funds, the security afforded its members, if 
any, and to those by whom its engagements are 
held, whether or not it is violating any 
provisions of law relating to corporations or to 
the business of the institution examined, whether 
or not it is complying with its articles of 
incorporation and bylaws, and as to such other 
matters as the commissioner may prescribe. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In addition, Sections 7-1-8 and 7-1-13 through 7-1-23 
further set forth in detail the kind of supervision which is to 
be exercised by the Department of Financial Institutions over 
the financial institutions under its jurisdiction. The 
carrying out of the specific statutory requirements are 
therefore ministerial acts and not discretionary acts. 
In State es rel. Funk v. Turner, et al., 42 S.W.2d 594 
(Mo. 1931), the Missouri Supreme Court considered the 
responsibility of the bank examiner and stated as follows: 
The difficulty arises in the classification of 
the duties of a bank examiner, whether 
discretionary or ministerial. To solve this 
question we must refer to Section 11689 R.S. Mo. 
1919. This section makes it mandatory that every 
bank be examined at least once a year. 
Additional examinations may be made when deemed 
necessay in the judgment of the commissioner. 
The section further provides: 
On every such examination inquiry shall be made 
as to the condition and resources of such 
corporation or banker, the mode of conducting and 
managing its affairs, the actions of its 
directors or trustees if a corporation, the 
investment of its funds, the safety and prudence 
of its management, the security afforded to those 
by whom its engagements are held, and whether the 
requirements of its charter and the law have been 
complied with in the administration of its 
affairs; and as to such other matters as the 
commissioner may prescribe. 
By the provisions of this section the 
commissioner must make at least one examination 
each year. This duty is not a discretionary one, 
but it is ministerial; he has no alternative or 
choice in the matter. The same section leaves it 
to the judgment of the commissioner to make 
additional examinations . . . . We are also of 
the opinion that the section makes it the 
mandatory duty of the officer who conducts the 
examination, to inquire into the various matters 
set out in the statute. Since it is mandatory it 
becomes a ministerial duty, the examiner must 
make the inquiry with reference to the various 
matters set forth in the statute. 
A haphazard examination by an examiner into the 
matters required by the statute is not 
sufficient. Where a statuts requires an act to 
be done, it must be performed with a reasonable 
degree of diligence, care and prudence. Failure 
to so perform that duty is in law negligence. 
Id. at 598. [Emphasis added.] 
The respondents thus had a clear mandated duty to 
examine each year all financial institutions which came within 
the definition set by the Legislature in Section 7-3-3. Even 
the type and extent of inspection was set by the Legislature. 
Respondents cannot therefore say that they had to exercise 
discretionary judgment in determining the kind of supervision 
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which the Department of Financial Institutions should exercise 
over the financial institutions within the State of Utah. 
D. The Respondents Decisions As To The Manner In 
Which They Would Supervise Does Not Rise To The 
Policymaking Level. 
The respondents claimed in the lower court that they 
also had discretionary decisions as to the manner in which such 
supervision was to be carried out by the Department of 
Financial Institutions. Although some discretion may have had 
to be exercised, it would not rise to the level of basic 
policymaking and therefore does not come within the exception 
to the waiver set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 
(1972). 
In the 1965 debates over Senate Bill No. 4, which 
later became the Governmental Immunity Act, Senator Welch, the 
sponsor of the bill, explained to his Senate colleagues that 
the proposed Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after 
the Governmental Immunity Act which had been enacted in 
California in 1963. Section 820.2 of the Government Code of 
California is California's equivalent to Utah's Section 
63-30-10(1). The California statute reads as follows: 
A public employee is not liable for an injury 
resulting from his act or omission where the act 
or omission was the result of the exercise of the 
discretion vested in him, whether or not such 
discretion be abused. 
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The California courts, like the courts in Utah, have 
considered a great number of cases defining this discretion 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity. In Johnson 
v. State, 73 Cal. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968), the California 
Supreme Court noted: 
It would be difficult to conceive of any official 
act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did 
not admit some discretion in the manner of its 
performance, even if it involved only the 
hammering of a nail. 
Id. at 357. 
The court therefore looked to the legislative purpos 
for this discretion exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity and determined: 
Courts and commentators have therefore centered 
their attention on the assurance of judicial 
abstention in areas in which the responsibility 
for basic policy decisions has been committed to 
coordinate branches of government . . . . 
Id. at 360. 
In Ramos v. County of Madera, 94 Cal. 421, 484 P.2d 
(1971), the California Court stated: 
*
n
 Johnson we reviewed the semantic quicksand 
which had ensnared the concept of "discretion" in 
the unyielding trap of incomprehensibility. We 
noted that discretionary acts have been defined 
as those wherein no hard and fast rule as to the 
court of conduct that one must or must not take 
Finding the semantic distinction between 
discretionary and ministerial inadequate as a 
method of deciding actual controversies, we 
followed our landmark precedent of Lipman v* 
Brisbane Elementary School District, (citiation 
omitted), in concentrating on policy 
considerations relevant to the governmental claim 
of immunity. Discretionary activity, we held, is 
related to basic policy decision, or that 
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activity sometimes characterized as the "planning" as 
opposed to the operational level of decisionmaking. 
^d. at 98-99. 
It is clear, therefore, that this discretionary 
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for negligent 
action of employees of public entities both as interpreted in 
the State of Utah and in the State of California only applies 
to basic policymaking decisions. In the instant case, the 
State Legislature, and not the respondents, made the basic 
policy decisions and the respondents were left simply to 
implement those decisions on an operational level. Respondents 
therefore are not entitled to the protection of the 
discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental immunity. 
E. Examination of the Statutory Language Establishes 
Appellants' Position. 
In dealing with the problem of whether a statute is 
mandatory or directory, this Court has stated: 
We are impressed with the difficulty that would 
be encountered in attempting to state any 
definite and invariable rule by which directory 
provisions of a statute could always be 
distinguished from those which are mandatory. It 
best serves our purpose here to point out 
generally that there are at least some guidelines 
to be followed. The most fundamental one is that 
the court should give effect to the intention of 
the legislature. That requires us to consider 
what the figurative "legislative mind" would have 
intended had it adverted to the particular 
circumstances we are confronted with for 
adjudication. This in turn leads us to analyze 
the statute in the light of its history and 
background; the purpose it was designed to 
accomplish; and wha interpretation and 
application will best serve that purpose in 
practical application. 
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Sjostrom v, Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393, P.2d 472 (1964). 
With respect to its use in a statute, the word "shall" 
is usually presumed to be mandatory. State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 
2d 45, 347, P.2d 1111 (1960). 
Examination of the relevant statutes upon which the 
appellants rely in asserting a duty on the State shows 
extensive use of the word "shall." 
The bank commissioner, or an examiner shall visit 
and examine every bank . . . at least once in 
each year. 
At every such examination, careful inquiry shall 
be made as to the condition and resources of the 
institution examined . . . . 
Section 7-1-8, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
The bank commissioner may at any time, and at 
least once a year shall require the board of 
directors of very institution . . . to examine or 
cause to be examined fully the books, papers and 
affairs of the institution . . . . 
Section 7-1-14, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
The bank commissioner shall each year make not 
less than four calls for report of condition upon 
each bank . . . . 
Section 7-1-17, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
The administrator shall examine . . . the loans, 
business and records of every licensee « . . . 
Section 70B-3-506, U.C.A. [Emphasis added.] 
This may be contrasted with use of the word "may" or 
the phrase "shall have power to" in other various sections of 
Title 7. See, for example, Sections 7-1-12, 7-1-16 and 7-1-18, 
U.C.A. 
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The manner of use of the word "shall" in these 
statutes is entirely consistent with language specifically 
directing that something be done. There is no discretion 
involved. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS' NEGLIGENT CONDUCT WAS MORE THAN 
A FAILURE TO MAKE AN INSPECTION OF PROPERTY 
Appellants alleged in their complaint that the 
respondents had a duty to: 
(A) Vist and examine every banking business at 
least once a year. 
(B) At the time of each annual visit to inquire 
into the condition and resources of the 
institution examined, the mode of conducting and 
managing its affairs, the official actions of its 
directors and officers, the investment and 
disposition of its funds, the security offered to 
members and whether or not it was violating any 
provision of law; 
(C) Notify the board of directors of any banking 
business in writing if any officer or employee of 
that bank was found to be dishonest, reckless or 
incompetent or fail to perform any uty of his 
office; 
(D) Require the board of directors of each 
banking business to examine the affairs of the 
institution with a special purpose of 
ascertaining the value of the security thereof; 
(E) Call for not less than four separate reports 
each year concerning the condition of each 
banking business to certify such report for 
publication; 
(F) To call for special reports as may be 
necessary for the protection of the public; 
(G) Inform the county attorney of any violation 
of any provision of law which constitutes a 
misdemeanor or felony by any officer, director or 
employee of any banking business • . .. 
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Utah Code Ann. §§7-1-8, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-1-17, 7-1-18 
and 7-1-23.) 
The respondents, as well as the district court, 
apparently lumped these duties together and defined them as a 
duty to make an inspection of the records of Grove Finance 
Company. 
The district court granted respondents1 motion for 
summary judgment in part on the basis that Section 
63-30-10(1)(d), Utah Code Ann., operates as an exception to 
waiver of immunity from suit for the breach of these duties. 
Section 63-30-10(1)(d), Utah Code Ann., states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately committed within 
the scope of his employment except if the injury 
. . . (d) Arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection of any property . . . . 
This section does not have applicability to the duties 
of respondents as found in Titles 7 or 70B of the* Utah Code. 
Hence, the court erred in holding that an inspection of 
property was involved in this case and thus granting 
governmental immunity. 
To understand this concept, it is necessary to first 
consider how Section 63-30-10(1)(d) is to be applied. 
The fundamental consideration which transcends 
all others in regard to the interpretation and 
application of a statute is: What was the intent 
of the legislature? 
. . . 
In determining that intent, the statute should be 
considered in the light of the purpose it was 
designed to serve and so applied as to carry out 
that purpose. 
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Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 
P.2d 831 (1966). 
There is apparently no case law in Utah which 
specifically interprets what constitutes an inspection of 
property within the meaning of §63-30-10(1(d), Utah Code Ann. 
However, the transcript of the 1965 State Senate debates over 
Senate Bill No. 4, which later became the Governmental Immunity 
Act, is instructive. As noted above, Senator Welch, the 
sponsor of the bill, explained to his senate colleagues that 
the proposed Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after 
the Governmental Immunity Act which had been enacted in 
California in 1963. 
The California statute reads as follows: 
A public entity is not liable for injury caused 
by its failure to make an inspection, or by 
reason or making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection of any property, . . . for the purpose 
of determining whether the property complies with 
or violates any enactment or contains or 
constitutes a hazard to public health or safety. 
Deering's Gov. C. §818.6. 
The purpose of this section of the California Code is 
to retain governmental immunity where an inspection of physical 
property is involved in determining whether or not it complies 
with safety standards or constitutes a hazard to health. 
The corresponding section of the Utah Act was intended 
to have the same purpose. During the senate debates over the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Senator Welch explained the 
purpose of this section of the Governmental Immunity Act: 
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So if the city turns up a plumbing inspector who 
inspects the plumbing or inspects the furnace and 
something goes wrong and it explodes, you can't 
sue the city on account of that by saying that 
the inspector was negligent. You cannot bring an 
action against that individual or entity. 
(R. at 664.) 
The only Utah cases decided under Section 63-30-19(d) 
confirm this meaning. 
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 24 Utah 
2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), involved application of the statute 
to deny liability for the failure of the state to inspect 
safety devices at railroad crossings. 
White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah 1978), involved a 
claim of injury due to the failure of certain vegetable canning 
equipment to meet prescribed safety standards. Section 
63-30-10(1)(d) was applied in finding the State not liable for 
failure to take action after an O.S.H.A. inspection revealed 
safety violations. 
It is clear from the foregong that there is a clear 
distinction between making an inspection of property within the 
meaning of Section 63-30-10(4) and the statutory duty imposed 
upon respondents to at least once a year visit and examine each 
corporation in the state doing doing a banking business. The 
latter with its detailed duties specified in Section 7-1-8 is 
more like an audit of books and records than an inspection of 
property. 
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POINT IV 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE 
RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO ENFOCE 
THE CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 
The respondents claimed in the lower court that they 
further had the discretionary decision of whether or not to 
issue administrative orders. The appellants do not deny that 
such might be the case. However, once the decision had been 
made to issue a cease and desist order and such an order was 
issued to Grove Finance Company, a duty arose at that time to 
properly enforce such an order. In Seymour National Bank v. 
State, 384 N.E.2d 1177, 1185 (Ind. 1979), the Court held that a 
public official had discretion in formulating policy. Once the 
policy was formulated, however, the same official acted in a 
ministerial capacity in the implementation of the policy. The 
respondents in this case totally failed to enforce the cease 
and desist order and substantial deposits were made in Grove 
Finance after the order was issued. 
property. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND STATE OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
The limitation imposed upon any potential recovery of 
the appellants due to the operation of the Governmental 
Immunity Act is a denial of equal protection. 
The Governmental Immunity Act violates equal 
protection by classifying people in three different ways: 
-25-
1* It classifies victims of negligence by whether 
they have been injured by a non-governmental tort-feasor or a 
government tort-feasor. It denies or places significant 
limitations on recovery to the latter class. (See Sections 
63-30-10, 63-30-29, Utah Code Ann.) 
2. It classifies victims of government tort-geasors 
by whether they have suffered personal injury or property 
damage. It differentiates between the groups by the amount of 
recovery allowed. 
3. It classifies victims of government tort-feasors 
negligence by the severity of the injury. It may grant full 
recovery to those victims who have not sustained significant 
injury by allowing them to recover up to $100,000 in damages. 
It discriminates against the severely injured victims by 
denying any recovery for any injuries over $100,000. 
The guarantees of equal protection under the 
consideration requires all persons to be treated alike under 
like circumstances. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, 
Section 1, and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. When 
a fundamental right is affected, the State must show a 
compelling state interest in order to justify the complained of 
discrimination. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, ETC., 655, P.2d 1133 
(Utah 1982); Utah Public Employees Ass'n. v. State, 610 P.2d 
1272 (Utah 1980). 
The right to bring a civil action for personal 
injuries has been recognized as being a fundamental right. 
White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment rendered in favor of the 
defendants-respondents in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County State of Utah, should be reversed. The duties 
of inspection of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
imposed by Title 7 and Title 70B are in fact mandatory or 
ministerial and the negligent failure of the State to perform 
its duties cannot be waived. Further, the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act as applied by the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County State of Utah in reaching its decision is 
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clauses 
found in the Fourteenth Admendment, Section 1 of the United 
State Constitution and Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
DATED this ) ( day of October, 1984 
KESLER & RUST 
Rust 
c (fc^tf 
Charles W. Hanric ianna 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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